The world economy, read from Canada

The picture in one page

World output grew at a similar pace from 2023 to 2025, unevenly across economies. It grew 2.9% in 2025; among the thirteen major economies compared, growth ranged from 7.6% in India to 0.2% in Germany, and euro area GDP was 1.3% higher in Q3 2026 than a year earlier. The year's main change is in prices and policy rather than output: Brent crude averaged US$71.10 a barrel in February and US$125.00 in October 2026, and consumer price inflation in the latest month is 4.0% in the euro area (October 2026), 3.7% in the United States (September 2026), 3.5% in the United Kingdom (September 2026) and 3.1% in Canada (September 2026).

Long-term yields are higher than a year ago in all three markets shown: the US ten-year yield is 4.84%, Canada's 3.67% and the euro area's AAA yield 3.29%.

Key findings at a glance

1. World output grew 2.9% in 2025, with India at 7.6% and Germany at 0.2%. Euro area GDP was 1.3% higher in Q3 2026 than a year earlier. Growth

2. Energy prices jumped in March and remain high. Brent crude averaged US$71.10 a barrel in February and US$125.00 in October 2026; the European gas price is 153.6% above its February level while the US gas price has not risen. Energy

3. Inflation has risen again: 4.0% in the euro area, 3.7% in the United States, 3.5% in the United Kingdom and 3.1% in Canada. The figures are for October 2026 in the euro area, September 2026 in the United States, September 2026 in the United Kingdom and September 2026 in Canada. In February the four rates were between 1.8% and 3.0%. Inflation

4. The Federal Reserve and the ECB have raised rates this year, and so have the Bank of Canada and the Bank of England. The ECB deposit rate has gone from 2.00% to 2.50% and the US federal funds rate from 3.64% to 3.88%; both banks left their rates unchanged in late October. Canada's overnight rate is 2.50%, after its increase of 28 October, and the Bank of England raised Bank Rate to 4% on 5 November. Central banks

5. Long-term government bond yields are higher than a year ago in all three markets shown. The US ten-year yield is 4.84% (to 5 November 2026), Canada's 3.67% (to 5 November 2026) and the euro area's AAA yield 3.29% (to 5 November 2026). The US–Canada gap is 1.17 percentage points. Bonds

6. Technology-related goods account for much of the growth in world merchandise trade, according to the WTO's October outlook. The WTO raised its forecast for 2026 merchandise trade volume growth to 3.9% from 1.9%. Canada sends 72% of its goods exports to the United States (customs basis, calendar 2025; the Canada report's monthly balance-of-payments figure differs slightly), where a tariff dispute is under way. Trade · Tariffs

7. Labour markets differ: unemployment is 4.2% in the United States, 6.5% in the euro area, 4.7% in the United Kingdom and 6.7% in Canada. These are for September 2026 in the United States, September 2026 in the euro area, July 2026 in the United Kingdom and October 2026 in Canada. Populations are shrinking in Japan (-0.5%) and China (-0.2%), and the share aged 65 and over is 30.0% in Japan and 20.3% in Canada. Labour and demographics

8. Canada ranked 5th of 13 in growth and 4th of 13 in GDP per person among thirteen economies in 2025, with output per worker at 72% of the US level. Productivity · Canada in the world

9. Central government debt was 130.7% of GDP in the United Kingdom and 115.8% in the United States in 2024, the latest World Bank year. The UK series has an unexplained break between 2021 and 2022, described in the government debt section. Government debt

What this report does not cover. There is no international comparison of house prices, credit spreads, equity markets, supply-chain pressure or shipping, tariff rates by country, industrial policy, semiconductor or AI investment data, or monthly data for China, Japan or India. Bank of England, Bank of Japan, BIS, OECD and IMF data are not used. Each section says what is missing.

What happened

World real GDP grew 2.9% in 2025, according to World Bank data, close to the pace of the two previous years (2.9% in 2024 and 2.9% in 2023). Growth among the major economies was uneven. India grew 7.6% (ranked 1st of 13 in growth among the economies compared here), China 5.0%, the United States 2.2%, Brazil 2.3% and Canada 1.7%. At the other end, the euro area grew 1.4%, the United Kingdom 1.4%, Australia 1.4%, Japan 1.2%, South Korea 1.0%, France 0.8%, Mexico 0.6% and Germany 0.2%.

More recent quarterly data for Europe show a modest picture. Euro area real GDP was 1.3% higher in Q3 2026 than a year earlier, with Germany at 1.2%, France at -0.1%, Italy at 0.8% and Spain at 2.7%. UK real GDP changed by 0.5% from the previous quarter in Q2 2026.

The size of the economies differs by the measure used. At market exchange rates the United States produced US$30.8 trillion in 2025, China US$19.5 trillion, the euro area US$18.0 trillion and Canada US$2.3 trillion. At purchasing-power parity, which adjusts for differences in local prices, China's output was 134% of the US level, against 63% at market exchange rates.

Why it happened

The annual data in this section cannot say why countries grew at different speeds. They show only the outcome. India (ranked 1st of 13 by population in the sample) has 1.46 billion people and a population growth rate of 0.9%, against -0.5% in Japan, so, arithmetically, some of the gap between fast and slow growth in total output reflects population growth. Growth per person is shown in the living-standards figures below.

Why it matters

History

Growth fell sharply in 2020 and rebounded in 2021 in every economy compared here. World growth was -2.9% in 2020 and 6.5% in 2021. The euro area then grew faster than the United States in 2022 (3.7% against 2.5%); from 2023 US growth was ahead of the euro area's by a narrowing margin: the United States grew 2.9%, 2.8% and 2.2% over 2023–2025 while the euro area grew 0.5%, 0.9% and 1.4%, and Germany -0.9%, -0.5% and 0.2%.

Living standards have risen at very different speeds. GDP per person at purchasing-power parity, in constant 2021 international dollars, was $76,931 in the United States in 2025, up 39.8% since 2000. Canada's was $57,990, up 19.8% over the same 25 years, and equal to 75% of the US level. South Korea's rose 110.9% to $55,697, China's 516.5% to $25,067 and India's 233.5% to $10,039.

Across geographies

Among the thirteen economies compared, Canada's 2025 growth ranks 5th of 13, and its GDP per person ranks 4th of 13. The euro area aggregate is included in the ranking and overlaps with Germany and France. Rankings are descriptive: they say nothing about policy.

What it influences

Risks

What to watch

Quarterly growth for the euro area and the United Kingdom is among the hard data in this report with the shortest delay; forward release dates for Eurostat and the ONS are not held here. The Bank of Canada's next Monetary Policy Report, due with its announcement of 27 January 2027, will update the projections quoted here; the IMF's World Economic Outlook and the OECD's economic outlook are not included.

What happened

Output per person employed, in constant 2021 international dollars, was $156,983 in the United States in 2025, $125,086 in Germany, $128,587 in France, $114,582 in Australia, $113,563 in Canada, $111,234 in the United Kingdom, $99,046 in South Korea and $87,888 in Japan. China's was $48,126 and India's $24,842. Canada ranks 6th of 13 on this measure among the thirteen economies compared here (the euro area aggregate is counted alongside Germany and France).

Why it happened

Two structural indicators are available for the same economies. Research and development spending was 3.4% of GDP in the United States in 2023, 4.9% in South Korea, 3.4% in Japan, 3.2% in Germany and 1.8% in Canada (2024). Gross capital formation, the closest World Bank measure of investment, was 23.2% of GDP in Canada (2025) against 21.5% in the United States (2024).

Why it matters

History

Canada's output per worker rose 15.3% between 2000 and 2025. The United States' rose 42.8% over the same years, Germany's 12.8%, Australia's 19.4%, South Korea's 72.8%, and China's 541.0%. Canada's level relative to the US was 72% in 2025. In 2000 Canada's output per worker was $98,476 and the US figure $109,946.

Across geographies

Mexico's output per worker ($48,141) was lower in 2025 than in 2000 ($53,742), unlike the other economies in the sample. The services share of the economy, 64.1% of GDP in Canada (2022), compares with 76.3% in the United States (2021); manufacturing contributes 9.3% in Canada (2022), 17.6% in Germany, 27.4% in South Korea and 24.7% in China. The reference years differ: the most recent Canadian values for these two structural indicators are older than the Korean and Chinese ones.

What it influences

Risks

What to watch

Statistics Canada's quarterly productivity release and national accounts update the Canadian side of the comparison; the equivalent releases for the United States come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Cross-country comparisons update only when the World Bank refreshes its database, a few times a year.

What happened

Consumer price inflation has moved up in 2026 in all four advanced economies shown here. In October 2026 the euro area's HICP was 4.0% above its year-earlier level. The rates were 3.7% for the United States' CPI-U in September 2026, 3.5% for the United Kingdom's CPI in September 2026 and 3.1% for Canada's CPI in September 2026. In February, before the energy-price jump, the rates were 1.9% in the euro area, 2.4% in the United States, 3.0% in the United Kingdom and 1.8% in Canada.

Within the euro area the rise is broad. The latest rates are 2.8% in Germany, 3.8% in France, 5.6% in Italy and 4.9% in Spain.

Why it happened

Why it matters

Purchasing power depends on whether pay grows faster than prices. In the United States, average hourly earnings of private-sector employees rose 3.0% over the year to September 2026, against consumer price inflation of 3.7%, so pay growth was below price inflation.

History

The 2021–2023 inflation surge is visible in the World Bank's annual data: consumer price inflation (annual average) in 2022 was 8.0% in the United States, 8.5% in the euro area, 7.9% in the United Kingdom and 6.8% in Canada, against 1.8%, 1.4%, 1.7% and 1.9% in 2019. The 2026 monthly rates are well below those peaks. China's annual inflation was 0.1% in 2025 and Japan's 3.2%.

Across geographies

In the World Bank's annual data, Canada's 2025 inflation rate of 2.1% ranks joint 9th of 12 (highest first) among the economies with data for that year; the United States is excluded because the World Bank had not published its 2025 value. Brazil's rate, 5.0%, ranks 1st of 12 and China's, 0.1%, 12th of 12.

What it influences

Price rises that persist reduce the real value of savings and of fixed incomes, and raise the cost of living for households that spend a large share of income on fuel, food and housing.

Risks

What to watch

Next releases: consumer price indexes for the euro area (Eurostat), the United Kingdom (ONS), the United States (BLS) and Canada (Statistics Canada), and the central bank meetings in the central banks section. Core inflation, which excludes food and energy, is the key missing indicator for the United States and the euro area.

What happened

The Bank of Canada's overnight rate target was 2.50% on 5 November 2026, a change of 0.25 percentage points over the past year (measured over 250 business days), all of it from the increase of 28 October. The US federal funds effective rate averaged 3.88% in the latest week (4 November 2026), a change of 0.01 percentage points over the past 52 weeks, because a fall in the effective rate in December 2025 was reversed after the Federal Open Market Committee raised its target range in September. The European Central Bank's deposit facility rate stands at 2.50%, against 2.00% a year earlier, after increases in June and September.

Why it happened

Why it matters

History

The Fed's effective rate reached 5.33% on 2 August 2023 (five-year high of the weekly series) and was near zero (0.05%) in mid-2021. The ECB's deposit facility rate was negative until 2022 (-0.50% in June 2021) and peaked at 4.00% on 20 September 2023. The Bank of Canada's rate peaked at 5.00% on 13 July 2023.

The measured association between the changes in the two North American policy rates is strong. Across 191 months since 2010, the correlation between the 12-month change in the federal funds effective rate and the 12-month change in the Bank of Canada's rate is 0.93 when measured over the same months and 0.64 when the Canadian change is compared with the US change six months earlier.

Across geographies

All three central banks charted here have raised rates this year, at different times. Canada's rate rose on 28 October after almost a year without a change. The Fed's effective rate is 3.88% and the ECB's deposit rate 2.50%, against 2.50% for the Bank of Canada's overnight rate, but the instruments differ, as noted above. The Bank of England and Bank of Japan rates are not charted; their decisions are instead described from their own publications in the sections above: the Bank of England held Bank Rate in a 6–3 vote in September and raised it to 4% in an 8–1 vote announced on 5 November, and the Bank of Japan raised its rate in June and September and kept it on 30 October. The ECB raised its rates in June and September and kept them on 29 October, the Fed raised its range in September and kept it on 28 October, and the Bank of Canada raised its own rate on 28 October.

What it influences

Risks

What to watch

The Bank of Canada announces its next decision on 9 December 2026. The Federal Reserve decides on 9 December, the ECB and the Bank of England on 17 December; see also the release calendar. The relationship between Canadian and US rates in the History section is the main thing to test against the next decisions.

What happened

Government bond yields are higher than a year earlier in the three markets this report covers, though below their highs of this autumn. The US ten-year Treasury yield was 4.84% on 5 November 2026, the two-year 4.46% and the thirty-year 5.25%. Canada's ten-year benchmark yield was 3.67% and its two-year 3.17%. The euro area's AAA-rated ten-year yield was 3.29% and its two-year 2.96%.

Over the past year the US ten-year yield rose 0.67 percentage points and the Canadian ten-year rose 0.52 percentage points. The euro area ten-year yield was 3.29%, against 2.74% on 5 November 2025.

The US ten-year yield exceeds Canada's by 1.17 percentage points. The gap was 1.01 percentage points a year earlier, on 5 November 2025.

Why it happened

The two-year US yield moved from 3.52% on 11 February to 4.46% on 5 November 2026, a period that includes the Federal Reserve's September increase in its target range. The sources below link longer yields to expectations of future policy, inflation and government borrowing; this data cannot attribute the move to any one of them.

Why it matters

History

The US ten-year yield's highest value over the past ten years in this series was 5.31%, reached on 5 October 2026; its low over the same period was 0.52%. The US curve (ten-year minus two-year) is 0.4 percentage points on the latest reading and reached -1.1 percentage points on 3 July 2023, when short rates exceeded long rates. Canada's curve is 0.5 percentage points.

The three markets move together. The correlation between the 12-month change in the US ten-year yield and the 12-month change in Canada's is 0.94 for the same months; between the US and euro area ten-year changes it is 0.79; between the euro area and Canada, 0.79. These coefficients are Northline's own calculations from the published yields (the ECB's euro area curve, the Federal Reserve's H.15 and the Bank of Canada's benchmark yields), not statistics published by those institutions.

Across geographies

On the figures above, the United States has the highest yields of the three markets at both two and ten years, Canada is in between and the euro area (AAA subset) is lowest. The instruments are not identical: the euro area series is an estimate for AAA-rated issuers, and Canadian and US yields are for each government's own benchmark bonds. The Bank of England, Bank of Japan and other central-bank bond data are not shown for the reasons in the limitations.

What it influences

The yield level feeds into mortgage rates, corporate borrowing costs and the cost of government debt. The Canada report (rates section) shows posted mortgage rates and the federal interest bill. This report does not estimate how much of the movement in Canadian mortgage rates is due to foreign yields rather than to domestic factors.

Risks

Large, fast moves in long-term yields can tighten conditions for borrowers and strain leveraged investors; this report has no data on leverage or market functioning and does not judge the probability of such an event.

Credit conditions: what is not assessed

Credit spreads (the extra yield on corporate or riskier debt), bank lending surveys and equity valuations are the usual measures of credit conditions. None is included here. Annual World Bank panels on lending rates and broad money exist but end years ago for several major economies and are not used to describe current conditions.

What to watch

The Federal Open Market Committee's next decision on 9 December and the ECB Governing Council's on 17 December; the Bank of Canada's next announcement on 9 December 2026; the release of the next consumer price indexes, which feed expectations of policy. US Treasury refunding announcements are not covered by this report.

What happened

The Canadian dollar's monthly average in October 2026 was C$1.4135 per US dollar, a change of 1.0% in the Canadian-dollar price of a US dollar over twelve months. The euro cost C$1.5832, the pound C$1.8790, the Japanese yen C$0.00895 and the Australian dollar C$0.9877. The ECB's reference rate for the euro averaged US$1.120 in October 2026.

Why it happened

This section is descriptive. The data do not say why exchange rates moved; the institutions quoted below give their own accounts. One measured fact is available: the 12-month change in the Bank of Canada's commodity price index (in US dollars) and the 12-month change in the C$ price of a US dollar have a correlation of -0.64 over 105 months. A negative coefficient means that rises in commodity prices went with falls in the Canadian-dollar price of a US dollar, that is, with a stronger Canadian dollar.

Why it matters

For Canadian exporters of commodities priced in US dollars, a weaker Canadian dollar raises the Canadian-dollar value of sales. For importers and consumers it raises the cost of imported goods.

History

The Canadian dollar has fluctuated in a range over the past decade. The US dollar's price in Canadian dollars was at its highest in the last ten years at C$1.4390 in January 2025 and lowest at C$1.2126 in May 2021. The euro has traded between US$0.983 (October 2022) and US$1.235 (February 2018) over the same decade.

Across geographies

The figure above rebases the Canadian dollar's value against eight currencies to the start of the period, so lines that rise mean the foreign currency became more expensive in Canadian dollars. Currency moves are bilateral: the Canadian dollar can rise against one currency and fall against another in the same month. Trade-weighted indices that summarise this are not included.

What it influences

Risks

What to watch

The Bank of Canada's next announcement on 9 December 2026 and the next Federal Reserve and ECB decisions; US and Canadian inflation reports that feed expectations of policy; the monthly average rates for November.

What happened

Trade is a much larger share of output in some economies than others. In 2025 exports plus imports of goods and services equalled 63.5% of GDP in Canada, 79.9% in Mexico, 86.4% in South Korea, 78.5% in Germany, 38.0% in China and 44.9% in Japan (2024). The United States figure was 25.0% in 2024.

Current account balances differ in sign (a negative number is a deficit). As a share of GDP they were 6.6% in South Korea, 4.4% in Germany, 4.9% in Japan and 3.8% in China, against -3.8% in the United States, -3.1% in the United Kingdom and -1.0% in Canada.

Why it happened

The structural pattern in the annual data is long-standing. Canada's trade share was 82.8% of GDP in 2000 and is 63.5% now; Mexico's rose from 49.9% to 79.9% over the same years. The data show the change but do not explain it.

Why it matters

History

Canada's merchandise trade with the United States has long been dominant. In 2025 the United States took 72.3% of Canada's merchandise exports and supplied 45.9% of its imports. Among the partners listed, the United Kingdom was the second-largest export destination at 6.0%, followed by the European Union as a bloc at 5.5% and China at 4.5%. China supplied 11.5% of imports, Mexico 6.8% and the European Union 11.6%. The calendar-year shares are sums of monthly customs-basis data from Statistics Canada.

Across geographies

Merchandise exports in current US dollars show the scale: US$3.8 trillion for China, US$2.2 trillion for the United States, US$1.8 trillion for Germany and US$555 billion for Canada in the latest year the World Bank reports for each.

What it influences

How exposed is Canada compared with its peers?

Canada sells abroad a much larger share of what it produces than the United States does. Exports of goods and services were 31.3% of GDP in Canada in 2025 against 11.0% in the United States in 2024, nearly three times as large a share. Among the economies compared here Canada sits in the middle: South Korea (45.8%), Germany (40.4%) and Mexico (39.6%) are more export-dependent, while China (21.1%), India (22.3%) and Japan (22.0% in 2024) are less so.

The data behind this graphic

Exports of goods and services as a share of GDP

Item	Value
South Korea	45.8%
Germany	40.4%
Mexico	39.6%
France	33.4%
Italy	32.2%
Canada	31.3%
United Kingdom	30.6%
Australia	23.2%
India	22.3%
Japan	22.0%
China	21.1%
Brazil	17.8%
United States	11.0%

Download this graphic (SVG, with source)

What this means for Canadian decisions

Risks

What to watch

Statistics Canada's monthly merchandise trade release, the US Census Bureau's trade release and any further tariff changes announced by either government; the World Bank's annual updates for the cross-country picture.

What happened

This report records these events from the sources named. It does not list the products covered, which the proclamations' annexes set out and which have changed with each proclamation, and it does not estimate the value of trade affected beyond the figures quoted.

Why it happened

Why it matters

History

Across geographies

Tariff and restriction events involving China, the European Union, India, Mexico and other economies are not recorded here, because this report cites no official source for them. What the sources do give is how trade differs by region in 2026; they do not separate the effect of tariffs from energy disruption or AI investment.

What it influences

Risks

Supply chains:

Industrial policy and subsidies: Not assessed here.

What to watch

Further tariff announcements by either government, published in the US Federal Register and the Canada Gazette; Statistics Canada's next trade release on 8 December; the Bank of Canada's next announcement on 9 December 2026.

What happened

World energy prices rose sharply in March 2026 and have stayed high. Brent crude averaged US$71.10 a barrel in February and US$103.70 in March, reached US$120.40 in April, eased to US$83.40 in July and rose again to US$125.00 in October 2026. West Texas Intermediate, the benchmark for North American crude, was US$97.70 in October 2026, up from US$64.60 in February.

Natural gas diverged by region. The European price was US$28.50 per million BTU in October 2026, against US$11.24 in February; the Japanese LNG price is shown in the figure below; the US price was US$2.96, below its February level of US$3.61.

Why it happened

This report does not model the supply disruption. The IEA highlights, the World Bank's outlook and the WTO's update quoted above are the supply-side sources cited, and none gives current volumes by route or producer in the passages quoted here.

Why it matters

History

The Brent price's two-year high is shown above. For longer perspective, WTI averaged US$16.50 in April 2020 and peaked at US$114.60 in June 2022 over the past ten years. The European gas price peaked at US$70.04 in August 2022.

Across geographies

Energy dependence differs widely. Net energy imports were -95.0% of energy use in Canada in 2024, -211.2% in Australia and -9.8% in the United States (negative values are net exporters), against 87.3% in Japan, 83.2% in South Korea, 70.3% in Germany, 67.5% for the euro area (2023) and 36.0% in India. A price rise is therefore a gain for the first group and a cost for the second. Renewable sources supplied 67.0% of Canada's electricity in 2021, 77.4% of Brazil's, 39.8% of Germany's and 20.3% of the United States'.

What it influences

Risks

What to watch

Monthly Pink Sheet updates; the next IEA Oil Market Report; Statistics Canada's monthly crude oil and merchandise trade data; the Bank of Canada's next announcement on 9 December 2026. Natural gas, electricity and LNG in Canada are covered in the Canada report's industry section.

What happened

Most metal prices are higher than a year earlier, though gold and silver are well below their early-2026 highs and iron ore, also in the metals figure, changed by -12.3% over twelve months. Copper averaged US$14,508 a tonne in October 2026, 35.1% higher than a year earlier, and aluminum, nickel and zinc are shown in the figure rebased to the start of the period. Gold averaged US$4,105 an ounce in October 2026, after reaching US$5,020 in February 2026; silver averaged US$57.00.

Fertilizer and grain prices have moved differently. Potash (potassium chloride), which Canada exports in large volumes, averaged US$357.50 a tonne, below its US$405.00 peak of May 2026. Urea was US$420.00 and DAP US$803.10. US hard red winter wheat averaged US$317.00 a tonne, 37.3% above a year earlier.

Why it happened

Who gains and who pays

The twelve-month moves are very uneven, which matters for who benefits. Silver rose 15.4%, wheat 37.3% and copper 35.1%, while the Bank of Canada's energy index rose 38.1% and its total index 23.5% (to September 2026). Potash, which Canada exports in large volumes, rose only 1.6%, and urea rose 6.5%.

The data behind this graphic

Price change over twelve months across the commodities Canada sells and buys

Item	Value
Bank of Canada energy index	38.1%
Wheat (US HRW)	37.3%
Copper	35.1%
Bank of Canada total index	23.5%
Silver	15.4%
DAP fertilizer	6.5%
Urea fertilizer	6.5%
Potash	1.6%
Gold	1.2%

Download this graphic (SVG, with source)

Three comparisons follow from the table, each about price moves and not about profits. Grain prices rose far faster than fertilizer prices, so what farmers sell rose faster than much of what they buy; potash exporters, though, saw little of the gain that metals and energy producers did. The energy index rose faster than the total index, so energy is pulling the Bank of Canada's measure of Canadian export commodity prices up; producing regions gain on export value while industries that use fuel or copper as inputs pay more. And gold rose 1.2% over the year, less than copper's 35.1%.

These are monthly averages in US dollars, so Canadian-dollar returns also depend on the exchange rate, which this section does not adjust for. The figures show direction, not forecast.

Why it matters

Commodity prices feed into export revenue for Canada's mining, potash, grain and forestry sectors and into input costs for manufacturing, construction and farming. The Bank of Canada's commodity price index summarises export-weighted commodity prices: its total index stands at 747.7 in September 2026, 23.5% above a year earlier, and its energy component at 1,636.5.

History

Gold's average of US$1,561 in January 2020 compares with US$4,105 now. Copper's was US$6,031 in January 2020. Both are shown in the figures above.

Across geographies

World prices are the same for every seller, but their impact differs by economy. Canada's exports of metals and minerals, potash and grains are shown in the Canada report's trade and industry sections; provincial exposure to resources is in the relationship explorer.

What it influences

Risks

Commodity prices are volatile, and a fall in prices after a rise would cut export revenue. This report has no forecasts of commodity prices and gives none.

What to watch

The World Bank's monthly Pink Sheet and the Bank of Canada's monthly commodity price index; Statistics Canada's merchandise trade release for export volumes and values.

What happened

Industry makes up very different shares of national output. Manufacturing value added was 27.4% of GDP in South Korea, 24.7% in China, 20.0% in Mexico, 18.8% in Japan, 17.6% in Germany, 10.5% in the United States (2021) and 9.3% in Canada (2022); the reference years differ.

In the euro area, industrial production (mining, manufacturing and energy, 2021 = 100, seasonally adjusted) was 97.6 in August 2026, a change of -1.1% over twelve months. Germany's index was 90.7, France's 102.4, Italy's 92.8 and Spain's 103.8.

Why it happened

Why it matters

History

Germany's manufacturing share was 20.3% of GDP in 2000 and is 17.6% now; South Korea's was 26.6% and is 27.4%; Canada's was 17.3% and was 9.3% in 2022, the latest year available.

Across geographies

Research and development spending as a share of GDP is highest in South Korea (4.9%), the United States (3.4%) and Japan (3.4%); Canada's is 1.8%. The latest year for Korea, the United States and Japan is 2023; Canada's is 2024.

What it influences

Risks

Infrastructure and industrial development

Not assessed. No international infrastructure indicator (investment, quality, project pipelines) has been included. Canada's infrastructure is covered in the Canada report to the extent that building investment data allow.

What to watch

Eurostat's industrial production release (monthly); Statistics Canada's monthly GDP by industry (the September data are due on 30 November); the WTO's quarterly goods-trade barometer, which is not included.

What happened

In the latest months unemployment was 4.2% in the United States (September 2026), 6.5% in the euro area (September 2026), 4.7% in the United Kingdom (July 2026) and 6.7% in Canada (October 2026). Within the euro area: 4.1% in Germany, 8.5% in France, 6.3% in Italy and 10.3% in Spain.

In the United States, payroll employment totalled 159.0 million jobs in September 2026, 0.3% above a year earlier, and average hourly earnings of private-sector employees were US$37.81 an hour, up 3.0% over twelve months.

Why it happened

The monthly series record levels, not causes.

Why it matters

History

Unemployment in the World Bank's annual (modelled ILO) data was 5.7% in Canada in 2019, 9.7% in 2020 and 6.9% in 2025; the United States' was 3.7% in 2019, 8.1% in 2020 and 4.2% in 2025.

Ageing is the slow-moving force. The share of the population aged 65 and over was 30.0% in Japan, 23.7% in Germany, 22.9% in the euro area, 20.3% in South Korea, 20.3% in Canada, 18.4% in the United States, 14.9% in China and 7.4% in India. South Korea's share was 7.1% in 2000; Canada's was 12.5%.

Across geographies

Population is growing 0.9% a year in Canada (2025, World Bank), 1.5% in Australia, 0.9% in India and 0.5% in the United States, and is shrinking in China (-0.2%), Japan (-0.5%) and South Korea (-0.1%). Labour force participation was 66.5% in Australia, 64.5% in Canada, 64.6% in China, 61.7% in the United States, 60.6% in Germany and 55.3% in France.

Canada among nine advanced economies

Canada's labour market has an unusual combination: one of the most active workforces and one of the highest unemployment rates. The participation rate was 64.5% in 2025, second only to Australia's 66.5% among the nine economies compared here, yet unemployment of 6.9% was the second highest after France's 7.5%. Because many people look for work but not all find it, Canada's employment-to-population ratio of 60.1% ranks only fourth, behind Australia (63.8%), South Korea (62.6%) and Japan (61.9%).

The data behind this graphic

Unemployment rate, 2025: Canada among nine advanced economies

Item	Value
France	7.5%
Canada	6.9%
Italy	6.4%
United Kingdom	4.7%
United States	4.2%
Australia	4.1%
Germany	3.7%
South Korea	2.7%
Japan	2.5%

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Population growth is the context. Canada's population grew 0.9% in 2025, second only to Australia's 1.5%, while Japan's changed -0.5% and Italy's, South Korea's and Germany's were close to flat. More people entering the labour force can raise unemployment for a time if hiring does not keep pace, but these data do not show that this is happening or how much it explains.

The data behind this graphic

Population growth, 2025: Canada among nine advanced economies

Item	Value
Australia	1.5%
Canada	0.9%
United States	0.5%
United Kingdom	0.3%
France	0.2%
Germany	0.0%
Italy	-0.1%
South Korea	-0.1%
Japan	-0.5%

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Age structure adds to the picture. Canada has 20.3% of its population aged 65 or older, below Germany's 23.7%, Italy's 25.1% and Japan's 30.0%, but above the United States' 18.4%. A faster-growing population is one way a country eases the pressure of ageing; whether the labour market can absorb that growth is the question the unemployment rate poses.

What this means for Canadian decisions

For an employer, unemployment is higher than in most peer economies, and the national average hides large provincial differences (see the provincial labour-market note). For a planner, high participation and high unemployment together do not show whether labour supply or demand is the constraint, and population growth has since slowed, as Statistics Canada reports above. These are annual 2025 figures on harmonised definitions and differ from the monthly Statistics Canada rates elsewhere in this report.

What it influences

Risks

What to watch

US employment reports (BLS), the euro area and UK labour market releases (Eurostat, ONS), and Statistics Canada's Labour Force Survey; Canada's next annual immigration levels plan.

What happened

No comparable cross-country housing series is held, so the picture below is each authority's own statement for its market, not a ranking.

Why it happened

Why it matters

History

Across geographies

What it influences

Risks

What to watch

CMHC's monthly housing starts, Statistics Canada's new housing price index, the Bank of Canada's mortgage-rate series and Eurostat's quarterly house price index.

What happened

Central government debt as a share of GDP was 130.7% in the United Kingdom (2024; see History on an unexplained break in this series), 115.8% in the United States (2024), 81.9% in Brazil, 64.1% in Canada, 50.3% in Mexico and 47.8% in South Korea. Japan, China, the euro area and Germany have no recent value in the database. Net lending (+) or borrowing (-) of the government, as a share of GDP, was -7.2% in the United States (2024), -6.9% in the United Kingdom, -5.9% in Mexico and -1.2% in Canada.

Why it happened

The World Bank data do not say why debt levels differ.

Why it matters

History

The United States' central government debt was 85.2% of GDP in 2010, 100.2% in 2019 and 115.8% in 2024. Canada's was 53.1%, 53.4% and 64.1%. The United Kingdom's was 130.5% in 2010, 159.0% in 2019 and 130.7% in 2024. Its series drops from 183.8% in 2021 to 138.2% in 2022, a fall in one year that the World Bank's notes for the series do not explain, so the change since 2019 should be read with that break in mind.

Across geographies

On the central-government measure, Canada's debt is lower than that of the United States and the United Kingdom. This is not a comparison of total public debt: provincial and state borrowing is outside the central-government measure.

What it influences

Risks

What to watch

The Department of Finance's monthly Fiscal Monitor, the federal government's next budget or economic statement, Statistics Canada's quarterly government finance statistics, and (not included here) the US Treasury's monthly statement.

What happened

Investment, measured as gross capital formation, was 40.5% of GDP in China (2024), 34.6% in India, 29.1% in South Korea, 27.7% in Japan (2024), 24.5% in Australia, 22.6% in Mexico, 23.2% in Canada, 21.5% in the United States (2024), 19.7% in the United Kingdom and 17.1% in Brazil.

Foreign direct investment inflows were 3.4% of GDP in Brazil, 3.0% in Canada, 2.4% in Mexico, 2.1% in Australia and 1.0% in the United States in 2025.

Why it happened

Why it matters

History

China's investment rate was 46.1% of GDP in 2010 and is 40.5%; India's was 39.8% and is 34.6%; Canada's was 23.5% and is 23.2%; the United States' was 18.7% and is 21.5%.

Across geographies

For Canada, quarterly data show net foreign direct investment into Canada of C$23.2 billion in Q2 2026 and Canadian direct investment abroad of C$14.4 billion. Real business gross fixed capital formation, which includes housing, was C$428.0 billion at an annual rate in the same quarter.

What it influences

Risks

What to watch

Statistics Canada's quarterly national accounts and balance of payments, and the Bank of Canada's Business Outlook Survey (not included here).

What happened

By the World Bank's income groups, growth in 2025 was 6.0% in lower-middle-income economies, 4.2% in upper-middle-income economies, 1.9% in high-income economies and 5.3% in low-income economies. The largest emerging economies in the sample grew 7.6% (India), 5.0% (China), 2.3% (Brazil), 5.1% (Indonesia) and 0.6% (Mexico).

Why it happened

Why it matters

History

GDP per person at purchasing-power parity in China rose from $4,066 in 2000 to $25,067 in 2025, in India from $3,010 to $10,039, in Brazil from $14,005 to $20,025 and in Mexico from $20,470 to $21,912. Mexico's GDP per person rose 7.0% over the 25 years, against 39.8% in the United States.

Across geographies

India is 16% as productive per worker as the United States on the World Bank measure, China 31%, Brazil 27% and Mexico 31%. Inflation in 2025 was 5.0% in Brazil, 3.8% in Mexico, 2.4% in India and 0.1% in China.

Not one emerging world

The label hides large differences. Real GDP growth in 2025 ran from 7.6% in India to 0.6% in Mexico among the large emerging economies in this report. China (5.0%) and Indonesia (5.1%) grew at about the same pace; Brazil's 2.3% was close to the United States' 2.2%; and Mexico grew more slowly than Canada's 1.7%. Grouped by income, lower-middle-income economies grew 6.0%, against 1.9% for the high-income group.

The data behind this graphic

Real GDP growth in 2025: income groups and large economies

Item	Value
India	7.6%
Lower-middle-income group	6.0%
Low-income group	5.3%
Indonesia	5.1%
China	5.0%
Upper-middle-income group	4.2%
Brazil	2.3%
United States	2.2%
High-income group	1.9%
Canada	1.7%
Mexico	0.6%

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Investment shows a similar split. Gross capital formation was 40.5% of GDP in China, 34.6% in India and 30.6% in Indonesia, against 22.6% in Mexico and 17.1% in Brazil, the lowest of the five and below Canada's 23.2%. This is a pattern across five countries, not evidence that investment alone causes growth; it does suggest that the slow-growing large economies are also the ones adding the least capital.

The data behind this graphic

Investment as a share of GDP: the fastest-growing large economies invest the most

Item	Value
China	40.5%
India	34.6%
Indonesia	30.6%
Canada	23.2%
Mexico	22.6%
United States	21.5%
Brazil	17.1%

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Prices and age structure differ too. Consumer price inflation in 2025 was 5.0% in Brazil, the highest of the five, and 3.8% in Mexico, while China's was 0.1%, close to zero; the series does not say whether that reflects weak demand, falling food prices or other causes. China is also ageing: 14.9% of its people are 65 or older, more than Brazil's 11.5% and about twice India's 7.4%, although well below Canada's 20.3%.

The data behind this graphic

Share of the population aged 65 and over

Item	Value
Canada	20.3%
United States	18.4%
China	14.9%
Brazil	11.5%
Mexico	8.5%
Indonesia	7.5%
India	7.4%

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What this means for Canadian decisions

For an exporter, investor or lender, "emerging markets" is not a market. The growth, investment, inflation and age profiles above point to different customers, different currency and price risks, and different time horizons for each economy. Canada's actual exposure is small and concentrated, as the trade section shows, so the first question is which country, which product and which year, not which category. These figures are annual and describe the past; they are not forecasts, and several lag by a year or more.

What it influences

Risks

What to watch

The IMF's next World Economic Outlook (not included here), the World Bank's twice-yearly Global Economic Prospects, and national statistical releases for China and India (not included here).

What happened

Three developments dominate the sources cited in this report. First, a war in the Middle East that, according to the Bank of Canada and Statistics Canada, is keeping energy prices high: Brent crude was US$125.00 in October 2026. Second, a trade dispute between Canada and the United States, with new tariffs and counter-measures since July (the tariffs section lists the US proclamations of July, August, September and October). Third, a rise in government bond yields, with the US ten-year at 4.84% and policy rates raised by the Federal Reserve, the ECB, the Bank of Canada and the Bank of England.

Why it happened

The sources name the causes only at the level of events.

Why it matters

History

The 2022 energy and inflation shock is the closest recent precedent in the data here: World Bank annual inflation reached 8.0% for the world and 8.5% for the euro area that year, and the European gas price peaked at US$70.04 in August 2022. The euro area's monthly rate is now 4.0%, below that 2022 annual average (the two are different measures, so the comparison is only indicative). Whether the 2026 rise will persist is not known.

Across geographies

Exposure differs. The World Bank's net energy imports data in the energy section show Canada, the United States and Australia as net exporters, which gain from higher energy prices, and Japan, South Korea, Germany and India as net importers, which lose. The Canada–US dispute concerns two economies whose trade is dominated, on the Canadian side, by the United States: 72% of Canada's merchandise exports in 2025.

What it influences

Risks

The risks and opportunities below are those documented in the sources cited; each rests on the source named.

Risks:

• Energy prices: gasoline and fuel oil drove the September acceleration in Canadian inflation (Statistics Canada), and the Bank of Canada raised its rate to reduce the risk that continuing high energy prices spread to other prices (Bank of Canada). The data to watch are the Brent price and the CPI energy components.
• Trade conflict: tariffs raise costs for businesses and could pass through to consumer prices (Bank of Canada); announcements distort monthly trade data (Statistics Canada). The data to watch are Canadian exports to the United States and manufacturing sales.
• Financial conditions: the Bank of Canada's October report lists the risk that global financial conditions tighten more than expected and long-term bond yields rise further (Bank of Canada). The data to watch are bond yields and mortgage rates.
• Weak domestic demand in Canada: the Bank's October report says the effects of uncertainty, particularly around the Canada–US trade relationship, could be larger than expected, lowering household spending and business investment (Bank of Canada).

Opportunities:

• Technology investment: strong AI-related investment is boosting global growth (Bank of Canada) and 47% of the growth in world goods trade in the first half of 2026 came from AI-enabling goods (WTO). The data to watch are the WTO's goods trade barometer and euro area and Asian industrial production; whether Canada gains is not shown.
• Energy exports: higher oil prices raise the value of Canadian energy exports (C$20.6 billion in September 2026), though volumes and costs matter too.

Not assessed in this section: other geopolitical conflicts, cyber risk, climate-related disruption, sovereign debt distress, financial-sector stress.

What to watch

The Bank of Canada's next announcement on 9 December 2026; the next IEA Oil Market Report; further tariff changes; the Federal Reserve's decision on 9 December and the ECB's on 17 December; the IMF's World Economic Outlook, which is not included here and which this report recommends reading directly.

What happened

On the World Bank's annual data for the thirteen economies compared in this report, Canada's 2025 GDP growth of 1.7% ranks 5th of 13, GDP per person at purchasing-power parity ($57,990) ranks 4th of 13, output per worker ($113,563) ranks 6th of 13 and trade as a share of GDP (63.5%) ranks (among the economies with 2025 data) 6th of 11. The unemployment rate in the annual data (6.9%) ranks 2nd of 13 (highest first). Canada is a net energy exporter: net energy imports are -95.0% of energy use.

Against the three most comparable monthly series, in the latest data: inflation is 3.1% in Canada, 3.7% in the United States, 4.0% in the euro area and 3.5% in the United Kingdom; unemployment is 6.7% in Canada, 4.2% in the United States, 6.5% in the euro area and 4.7% in the United Kingdom; and policy rates are 2.50% (Canada), 3.88% (United States, effective rate) and 2.50% (euro area deposit rate).

Why it happened

Position is an outcome of many things not measured here. Two facts from the sources cited describe the 2026 picture.

Why it matters

History

Canada's GDP per person at purchasing-power parity was 75% of the US level in 2025. In 2000 Canada's was $48,399 and the United States' $55,046. Australia's rose 33.5% over the 25 years to 2025 against Canada's 19.8%.

Across geographies

Global developments reach Canada's provinces unevenly. The share of each province's domestic merchandise exports going to the United States in 2025 ranged from 90% in New Brunswick to 35% in Newfoundland and Labrador, with 85% in Alberta, 72% in Ontario and 51% in British Columbia; energy products were 76% of Alberta's exports, 33% of Saskatchewan's and 54% of Newfoundland and Labrador's. Statistics Canada customs data attribute exports to the province of origin of the goods.

What it influences

Calgary, Edmonton, Toronto, Vancouver, Montréal, Ottawa and the other cities covered each have a city page.

Risks

See the risks section: the three developments that dominate the sources cited there affect Canada through energy prices (a gain on the export side, a cost for consumers), the United States as the main export market (tariffs and demand) and global financial conditions (yields and mortgage rates).

What to watch

The Bank of Canada's next announcement on 9 December 2026 (it said there could be a need to increase the policy rate further); Statistics Canada's monthly releases; the Federal Reserve and ECB decisions; Canada's performance relative to the United States on growth, inflation and unemployment.

What happened

The latest Gini index values for the economies charted run from 23.0 in India (2023) to 50.3 in Brazil (2024). Canada's is 31.5 (2022), the United States' 41.8 (2024), the United Kingdom's 32.4 (2021), Germany's 33.7 (2022), Mexico's 42.6 (2024) and China's 36.0 (2022).

Extreme poverty, the share of people living below the World Bank's international extreme-poverty line, was 52.5% in low-income economies, 12.4% in lower-middle-income economies, 2.1% in upper-middle-income economies and 0.6% in high-income economies in 2024; for the world as a whole it was 10.1%.

Why it happened

Not assessed: within-country inequality beyond the Gini panel, wealth inequality, and the causes of the differences between countries, for which the sources cited give only the broad pattern above.

Why it matters

History

Life expectancy at birth in 2024 was 80.4 years in high-income economies, 76.0 in upper-middle-income, 69.5 in lower-middle-income and 65.2 in low-income economies. In China it rose from 72.3 years in 2000 to 78.0, in India from 62.7 to 72.2 and in Canada from 79.2 to 82.1.

Across geographies

GDP per person at purchasing-power parity in 2025 was $59,556 in high-income economies and $2,481 in low-income economies, so the low-income average was 4% of the high-income average.

What it influences

Not assessed: how aid, remittances and debt relief affect poverty in any single country; this edition cites no source on those.

Two kinds of gap: between countries and within them

The figures describe two different problems. Between income groups the gaps are very large: 52.5% of people in low-income economies live below the extreme-poverty line against 0.6% in high-income economies, and life expectancy at birth is 65.2 years against 80.4. Within countries the pattern is looser. The Gini index is 50.3 in Brazil and 42.6 in Mexico, but also 41.8 in the United States, a high-income economy that is more unequal on this measure than China (36.0) or Canada (31.5). In these figures, income level does not predict how evenly income is shared.

Be careful with the lowest values. India's 23.0 is the lowest in the sample, but survey-based measures can be built from household consumption rather than income, which usually looks more equal, and the series here does not say which basis each country uses. Compare countries only with that caveat, and compare each country with its own earlier surveys where possible.

What this means for Canadian decisions

For a business entering a market, average income and the distribution of income answer different questions: the first sizes demand, the second shows how much of it sits with a small group. For policymakers and analysts, Canada's Gini of 31.5 (2022) is lower than that of the United States, the United Kingdom (32.4) and Germany (33.7). Those are survey years that differ between countries, and the index summarises the whole distribution in one number, so it cannot show who gains or loses.

Risks

Survey-based measures are revised when new surveys or purchasing-power benchmarks arrive, and a few surveys can change a country's position. Points in the chart are survey years, not a continuous record, and the latest year differs by economy (see the periods above).

What to watch

The World Bank's next update of its poverty and inequality data. No release date for it is in the calendar this site holds, and none is assumed.

What happened

Agriculture adds 16.2% of output in India, 13.1% in Indonesia, 6.7% in China and 6.1% in Brazil, against 1.9% in Canada (2022), 0.9% in the United States (2021) and 0.6% in the United Kingdom. By income group it is 27.2% in low-income economies and 1.3% in high-income economies.

Manufacturing adds 27.4% of output in South Korea, 24.7% in China, 18.8% in Japan (2024), 17.6% in Germany, 20.0% in Mexico, 10.5% in the United States (2021) and 9.3% in Canada (2022).

Why it happened

Sector shares change for many reasons that these series do not separate.

Not assessed: why sector shares of output and employment and urbanisation have changed over time, which no source cited explains; the paragraphs above describe investment and trade patterns, not the shares themselves.

Why it matters

History

Urban residents were 57.8% of the world's people in 2025, up from 42.8% in 1990. In China the urban share rose from 26.2% in 1990 to 66.3%, and in India from 25.6% to 35.7%.

Across geographies

Internet use was 23.4% of the population in low-income economies and 94.2% in high-income economies in 2025; in Canada it was 94.4% (2024), in India 70.0% and in Indonesia 72.8% (2024).

Research and development spending was 4.9% of GDP in South Korea (2023), 3.4% in the United States (2023), 3.2% in Germany, 2.6% in China, 2.7% in the United Kingdom and 1.8% in Canada (2024).

The same transition at different speeds

Across income groups, the economy changes shape in a recognisable order. Agriculture's share of GDP falls steeply: 27.2% in low-income economies, 17.8% in lower-middle-income, 6.9% in upper-middle-income and 1.3% in high-income economies. Urbanisation and connectivity rise alongside: the urban share of the population climbs from 35.2% to 80.2%, and the share of people using the internet from 23.4% to 94.2%.

Manufacturing is the exception. Its share of GDP is 8.5% in low-income economies, rises to 21.0% in the upper-middle-income group and falls back to 12.0% in high-income economies. China (24.7%) sits at the peak; Mexico (20.0%) is close behind; Canada's 9.3% (2022) is below the high-income group's. Group averages describe a pattern across countries, not a path every country follows, and the latest year differs between economies.

The data behind this graphic

Manufacturing as a share of GDP peaks in upper-middle-income economies

Item	Value
China	24.7%
Upper-middle-income group	21.0%
Mexico	20.0%
Lower-middle-income group	16.9%
India	13.5%
High-income group	12.0%
United States	10.5%
Canada	9.3%
Low-income group	8.5%

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Innovation spending separates the high-income group more clearly. Research and development was 2.9% of GDP in the high-income group, 3.4% in the United States and 2.6% in China, against 1.8% in Canada (2024) and 0.6% in India. China has already passed the upper-middle-income average of 2.0%; Canada has not reached the high-income average.

The data behind this graphic

Research spending as a share of GDP: Canada is below the high-income average

Item	Value
United States	3.4%
High-income group	2.9%
China	2.6%
Upper-middle-income group	2.0%
Canada	1.8%
India	0.6%
Lower-middle-income group	0.5%
Mexico	0.3%

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What this means for Canadian decisions

What it influences

Not assessed: how quickly the shifts described above will continue; no source cited gives a projection of sector shares.

Risks

Shares of GDP change when prices change, so a sector's share can move without any change in the volume it produces. Spending on research is an input, not a measure of what it achieves. Years differ across the series and countries, so the figures above are not a single-year snapshot.

What to watch

The World Bank's and UNESCO's next updates of these series. No release dates are in the calendar this site holds, and none is assumed.